Fourth Gen War at Sea

Galrahn is none too happy with this comment from military writer William Lind, which is part of a synopsis of a new anthology book from the Center for Defense Information titled “America’s Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress.”

Fourth Generation War demands the Navy shift its focus from Mahanian battles for sea control to controlling coastal and inland waters in places where the state is disintegrating.

While I have no problem myself with this seemingly innocent enough comment, Galrahn takes issue with the implication that Lind might be too narrow minded:

The fatal flaw of Mr. Lind’s argument however is that there must be a choice, Mahan or Corbett, and he carries these either/or arguments into his positions for maritime strategy including blue water or green/brown water. By taking either/or positions for 4th generation war in the maritime domain, Mr. Lind’s strategic view of the maritime domain appears flawed. The way ahead isn’t Corbett strategy instead of Mahanian strategy, the way ahead is the synergy of both towards a joint battle space capability from the sea that addresses the operational requirements of the battle space regardless of maritime geography.

The blogger is correct of course. It would be a fatal flaw for anyone to emphasize one strategy to the detriment of the other, say conventional over counter-insurgency. The problem yours truly has is THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE NAVY DOES! Consistently since the fall of the old Soviet Fleet the USN has paid lip service to the idea of littoral warfare in the shallow seas while wholly constructing warships designed for Blue Water operations. The most noticeable is the 9000 ton Arleigh Burke destroyers, almost 60 now built or building. At near $2 billion for each warship, with the class ongoing in construction since the late 1980s, is it any wonder we posses an ever decreasing number of vessels in the Fleet?

So with their stretched-thin shipbuilding budget, the old Cold War admirals will always ere on the side of caution and continue building ships they are familiar with, which are large carriers, cruisers, destroyers, nuclear attack subs, and specialized amphibious ships. The littoral combat ship, despite its name, is further proof that the Navy is clueless when it comes to 4th Generation war at sea. The overweight and over-budget platform is too big and too radical a design to construct quickly and in large numbers, and as we have learned from fighting Al Qaeda since the 1990’s, the terrorists have little patience with our leisurely building programs. Here is what Robert Kaplan said on the subject recently in the Atlantic:

The U.S. Navy has been working on the Littoral Combat Ship, which would provide added protection against swarm attacks. But it could be years before the required dozens of these ships are ready.

A crash program of small ship construction is desperately required. These most certainly should be off-the-shelf ships whether borrowed from our allies or even Coast Guard cutters refitted for naval service. The pirates are not intimidated by our technology or giant warships, but wonder if we have the will and equipment to follow them in their shallow water haunts.