Defeating Piracy-The Indirect Approach
As recently as the 1980s during Operation Earnest Will in the Gulf, America has seen the benefits of a convoy system to protect merchant shipping in a danger zone, but for some reason such sensible lessons are cast aside when it comes to the ongoing crisis off Somalia. The general consensus of late seems to be that the only way to crack down on the scourge of piracy there is for a land invasion. At the Baltimore Sun history professor Virginia Lunsford declares the Navy can’t do it alone:
It is important to keep a strong naval presence in the region. Suppressing Somali pirates at sea, however, will only go so far to eliminate the piracy itself. The region that CTF-151 must patrol is simply too large – some 1 million square miles. Furthermore, some traditional counter-piracy tactics – namely, blockading and convoying – are simply too expensive, impractical or unenforceable in this case.
Yet, such excuses echo throughout history when the very idea of convoy is mentioned, notably during the last World War. Back when Hitler’s U-boats were enjoying a “Second Happy Time” off the American coastline in the Winter, Spring and into the Summer of 1942, there was equal reluctance for convoys due to various circumstances. The Navy wanted to wait until sufficient escorts ships could be built, while the Air Force wanted to use their long range planes not for sea service but to bomb Germany. Yet, desperate Britain under blockade by the insurgents at sea since 1939, knew the only way to defeat the elusive undersea attackers was in the shelter of a convoy, no matter how loosely escorted.
By June of that year when sinkings off the US finally peaked at 1 million tons, the Navy had reluctantly given in while Army Air Force planes were also thrown into the fight. Merchant shipping losses dropped noticeably 25% by July. Still, some in the military felt there was a better way to end the submarine scourge once and for all, as Nathan Miller tells us in his book “War at Sea“:
Beginning in 1942, the question of a Second Front in Europe dominated relations between the Allies. Many Americans–President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and Admiral King among them–believed the best way to end the U-boat threat was to invade Europe as soon as possible and capture Germans bases on the Biscay coast.
Sounds familiar, right? Well, the aftermath is well told, how the invasion of Europe was postponed until 1944, while the Americans took an indirect route to Germany starting in North Africa, eventually ending up in Italy, before invading the Normandy coastline two years later. By then (specifically by 1943 according to the experts) the U-boats had been effectively defeated and the surge of troops and supplies to Northern Europe allowed the Allies to overwhelm Hitler’s vaunted Atlantic Wall.
Sledgehammer, the earlier plan to invade Europe as soon as possible was put off in favor of Operation Torch, as the former was seen too costly in men and ships so early after America’s entry into the war. The African route was probably the correct one, in which green US troops managed to become battle-hardened vets before having to face desperate German forces seasoned by years of fierce conflict. In its sea campaign against the U-boats, the Navy then became more cost-effective than the slaughter of perhaps hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers in France early in the war.
Those who call for an equally desperate attempt to end the pirate menace in Somalia seem equally short-sighted. Today we live in a society far more adversed to troop casualties than “the Greatest Generation” of the World War. Sending young Americans and allied soldiers into the hornet’s nest of Somalia currently appears as the least favorable option after the blood-letting our young men have already suffered in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While such an operation might eventually be required, just as invading Hitler’s Fortress Europe was essential to defeating Nazism, in the meantime, the Navy should and can provide a very cost-effective remedy, as back then, so now.
The West’s very expensive and highly under-utilized navies have not endured the drastic Post-Cold War transformations as their Army counterparts have, and this could be their moment. Initially the Big Ships built to fight World War 3 could serve some purpose, as they are practically all we have, followed by a crash construction program and the purchase of shallow draft and well-armed small craft to go after the menace, sink their boats and motherships, and arrest their buccaneer crews for prosecution. While this form of sea control will take time as it did in the World Wars, convoying merchant ships will show immediate results, as Galrahn at Information Dissemination explains:
First, it should be noted that convoys are already established from the Red Sea to northeast of the Horn of Africa, and this has produced some positive results. Convoys do work, and by reducing the area that needs to be protected by multinational forces the naval power available becomes more effective fighting off pirate attacks.
Hearing all the arguments against navies taking the fight to the pirates, and against convoys in particular all sound so familiar, as they are repeated with each new war against such small but elusive and numerous new threats at sea. These are not the kinds of enemies the Navy likes to fight, but I worry that if navies don’t get into the struggle against insurgents with their whole very substantial resources, that those expensive assets they now posses might be taken away and the savings spent on more current threats like the ongoing crisis in the Third World.
Sven, thanks for the history, but i won’t quibble on terminology. I just want see some type of order in this region for now. We have enough problems here at home.
Mike, you should maybe read a bit into the operational research about convoys.
Convoys protect merchant ships sometimes even when there’s no escort.
That’s a function of the attacker’s ability to locate his targets and his firepower effectiveness.
Imagine a submarine war without communications and central command like in wolfpack tactics.
Th establishment of convoys would lead to much less contacts for the subs, and the few lucky subs would face more targets than they can kill. The losses would thus be limited by two factors and would in many constellations be smaller than in normal shipping behaviour.
Now add the effects of escorting – especially the CVE-based air cover that “pressed” the subs under water and thus limited their effective speed and therefore ability to get into position for a shot.
The effects are manifold, and the end of the story is that convoying protects merchantmen even if the escorts were equipped with non-lethal arms.
Other beneficial effects apply as well, of course.
My key point was that operations on sea against can only suppress an enemy who can choose to simply stay at home – he cannot be defeated.
It’s similar to guerrillas who simply tune down their activity , but don’t all die or cease to be guerrillas when the government has checkpoints everywhere.
@ Sven,
convoys don’t protect merchant ships, they just make it easier for the sub-hunters to find and fight the subs.
Btw, Pompeius’ victory over the pirates was very much enabled by a three year effort led by Publius Servilius Vatia (Isauricus). Interestingly maybe for today are the political connections of the pirates (Mithradates) and the commercial interest the pirates served (large scale trade in cheap slaves).
I distinquish simple patrolling (as is being done now) from barrier opeations such as Market Time. I submit the latter can be effective and is MUCH more politically acceptable than putting BOG in Somalia. More timely also.
Typo in headline: You didn’t mean “Defeating Piracy-The Indirect Approach” but “Suppressing Piracy-The Direct Approach”.
Convoys don’t defeat, the best that they can do is to suppress activity by providing protection to targets.
The World War examples tell that quite clearly, as did the Spanish experience vs. English privateers.
The Spanish established convoying for the most valuable imports from the New World – years later the English adapt by sending privateer fleets to snatch whole convoys. No defeat, just temporary suppression.
WWI the British establish a convoy system in 1917 – the German reacted with a first version of wolfpack tactics in 1918. No defeat, just temporary suppression.
WWII the British and Americans use an elaborate convoy system – the German react with new technologies (including the first SSK ever), but the Allies were lucky to end the war before the next round in the Battle of the Atlantic was launched. No defeat – just temporary suppression.
Somali pirates harass international shipping close to Somalian waters – international reaction of convoying and patrolling with warships. The Somali pirates react by enlarging their hunting ground, circumventing most warships.
No defeat – just temporary & local suppression.
Pirates ravage the Mediterranean during the late Roman Republic – the Romans task Pompey to defeat them and provide the necessary funds.
Pompey prepares a fleet and marines for a campaign. Pompey’s fleets roll over the pirate bases along the coasts, push the pirates’ fleeing ships around and finally defeat them on the sea. No significant piracy plague in Mediterranean world for generations. Decisive victory over piracy.
We can patrol the coast of East Africa forever, stop patrolling and accept piracy – or we could stop the piracy.
The latter can be done by raiding the few towns that have strong links to piracy and by establishing draconian deterrence.
Alternatively we could go not for the pirates’ homes, but for those who pay ransom and dry out the economic basis of East African piracy.
Convoying/Patrolling will only suppress, never defeat.
Yeah, a little history never hurt anyone. It often repeats itself with the powers-that-be declaring that we have to learn news ways to fight war on the cheap. But the old ways still hold true.
Mike good historical perspective! The USN has traditionaly been less interested in what is now called NCAPS then fighting wars on the bounding main.
Now use the more recent Operation Market Time article I sent you and relate that to a barrier operation along the IO coast of Somalia. I would keep the MASP operation going.
P.S. this comment is a like you say pure bunk, bluewater myopia:
“some traditional counter-piracy tactics – namely, blockading and convoying – are simply too expensive, impractical or unenforceable in this case.”
When will naval historians debunk those kind of statements? Not so long as they are being paid by USN.